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Zusammenfassung  
Ethno-territoriale Protestbewegungen in Kanada und Frankreich bedrohen seit den 1960er 
Jahren die Muster der politischen Integration in den beiden politischen Systemen. Anhand 
der Untersuchung der nationalen Bewegungen in Québec und Korsika soll die Frage nach 
den Ursachen für die unterschiedlichen Entwicklungswege dieser regionalen 
Protestbewegungen untersucht werden. Im Fall Korsikas kann von einer klaren 
Radikalisierung der Bewegungen gesprochen werden, die z.T im Untergrund gewaltsam für 
ein unabhängiges Korsika kämpft. In Québec hingegen konnte sich die nationale Bewegung  
frühzeitig ins politische System der Provinz integrieren, um von dieser Basis aus den 
Zusammenhalt der kanadischen Föderation zu bedrohen. In vergleichender Perspektive wird 
dabei die Interaktion der Bewegung mit der Staatsmacht als zentrale Erklärungsvariable 
eingeführt. 
 
Résumé 
Mouvements de protestation territoriuax au Canada et en France menacent les modèles de 
l’intégration politique dans le deux sytèmes politiques depuis les annèe 1960. L’exploration 
des mouvements nationaux au Québec et en Corse, doit Ltre éxaminée les causes pour les 
développements différentes des ces deux mouvements. Dans la Corse, on peut parler d’un 
radicalisation du mouvement nationale qui combat en partie puissament dans le sous-sol 
pour une Corse indépendante. En Québec cependant, le mouvement national pouvait 
s’intégrer toutefois dans le systèms politique de la province, pour menace de cette base la 
cohésion de la fédération canadienne. L’interaction du mouvement avec le pouvoir d’ètat est 
introduit comme variable d’explication de cet évolution. 
 
 
 
 
Introduction  
 
Since the early 1960s ethno-territorial movements have increasingly challenged 
established patterns of political integration in western democracies. The purpose of 
this paper is to compare the formation and different paths of development of such 
nationalist movements in Quebec (Canada) and Corsica (France). The paper 
presents a brief outline of an argument more fully developed in a study on the two 
cases. After a short introduction I will first discuss theoretical aspects of minority 
nationalism. Secondly, I will try to give an overview over major findings and   
conclusions of my study.  
 
Quebec and Corsica present starkly dissimilar cases of conflict evolution. In the case 
of the Corsican nationalist movement we can clearly speak of a progressive 
radicalisation of nationalist activities and fragmentation of “the” nationalist 
                                                       
1 This article is based on a presentation given at the third Contemporary Canadian Issues Conference 
at the Mount Allison University (Sackville, N.B.) entitled „Nationalism, Citizenship, National 
Identity“ in November 1999. movement. Presently some parts of the nationalist movement are fighting for 
independence outside the legal bounds of the political system. In contrast the 
nationalist movement in Quebec has become highly integrated into the political 
system of the francophone province, threatening the cohesion of the Canadian 
Federation from inside the constitutional framework. Current theoretical models, 
focussing for the most part on the minority status of regional protest movements 
within modern nation states, generally fail to account for divergent experiences as 
these.   
 
Until the mid-1960's ethno-nationalism and ethno-nationalist movements were 
largely ignored in the social sciences. Modernization theories treated ethnicity as a 
somewhat archaic phenomena, which was alleged to disappear in the process 
modernization.
2 The political, social and economic conditions of modernization, it 
was assumed, required increasing standardization and homogeneity. The main 
agents for change were to be the educational system, the media as well as the army. 
Additionally, national elites were to transform the culturally different parts of the 
population into one national community, sharing common historical symbols, descent 
and national interests, regardless of social inequalities and class differences.
3  
 
With the benefit of hindsight it is safe to conclude that modernization did not work as 
smoothly or uniformly as theoretical models suggested. The persistence of ethno 
territorial protest-movements posed a challenge that could hardly be ignored. At first, 
attempts to cope with these perplexing anomalies tried to incorporate regional 
protest into the framework of modernization theory. Arend Lijphart, in particular, 
approached the problem as a problem of the nation-building process itself: if the 
latter is advancing too fast, the danger of a defective form of integration or 
assimilation of some groups arises. Lijphart still presupposed the integrative effects 
of modernization, but now saw a disturbed transaction-integration balance as a base 
for ethnic conflict.
4 
 
A second type of approaches focuses on the relationship between national minority 
movements and the process of socioeconomic modernization. Two different paths of 
research may be distinguished in this regard: One path depicts ethnic identities in 
opposition to the inescapable processes of modernization, as a revolt against 
modernity.
5 In this context, ethnic identity is seen as a given, 'primordialist' concept 
and defined as a counterweight to societal modernization. Ethnicity, in effect,  is 
                                                       
2 See for this Deutsch, 1966. The study of  Weber, 1977 seems empirically to confirm Deutschs 
theory.  
3 See Andersen, 1983, p. 80-125; Hobsbawn, 1990. 
4 Arend Lijphart: Political theories and the explanation of ethnic conflict in the Western World, in: 
Esman, ed., 1977, p. 46-64. 
5 Seymour Lipset: The revolt against modernity, in: Torsvik, ed., 1981, p. 451-500; See also: Walker 
Connor: Ethnonationalism in the first world, in: Esman, ed., 1877,  p. 19-45. defined as a basic principle of social reality that sleeps under the surface of 
modernity and that is awakened  if modernization fails.
6 
 
A third type of approaches assumes  a closer connection between the process of 
modernization and the emergence of ethno-territorial protest-movements. Studies 
from this perspective focus mainly on the connection between the historical roots of 
identities and their current forms of identity articulation. The objective is to better 
understand the conditions or, more precisely,  the mix of conditions that will lead to a 
politisation of ethnic groups. As in primordialist approaches, ethnic identities are 
conceptualized as a given factor. But in contrast to the former the emphasis is on 
causal factors that breed dissatisfaction and ultimately result in a rejection of 
established schemes of political integration. The conditions seen as the driving 
forces vary substantially in different models: in some cases uneven economic 
development is viewed as the main cause of mobilization
7 or,  more generally, simply 
the perception that a group or territory suffers from an unequal distribution of 
resources.
8 Michael Hechter, for example, speaks of the cultural division of labor as 
the main source of ethnic conflict
9, whereas other authors explain regional protest 
with reference to sectoral differences in the process of modernization.
10  All 
approaches share the assumption that the key factors lie in the socioeconomic 
situation of the analyzed group or territory as compared to the dominant society or 
core region of the state. Differences in economic growth rates and in the pattern of 
political integration result in a perception of inequality that can be interpreted in a 
cultural, political or economic sense.
11  
 
At first glance Quebec and Corsica seem to fit this model rather well: In both cases 
ethno-territorial movements developed at a time of rapid socioeconomic change and 
modernization. In both cases there is strong evidence of territorial divergent effects 
of modernization. Furthermore in both the regional protest movements can credibly 
refer to a common culture, history and language. But taking a closer look at the 
development, the issues as well as the movement leadership and supportive groups 
some aspects seem to raise new questions. From a comparative perspective the 
main problem is the divergent development of the nationalists in Corsica and 
Quebec. Despite similar socioeconomic environments the pattern of conflict 
evolution differs markedly in these two cases. This, I would argue,  can neither be 
                                                       
6 See for this in the context of African Case Studies Kreile, 1997,  p. 12-18. 
7 See Nairn, 1977. 
8 See Beer, 1980. 
9 Hechter, 1975. 
10  See for expample Gourevitch, 1979, p. 303-322. 
11 These approaches follow Stein Rokkan and DerekUrwins concept of opportunity structures. See 
Rokkan and Urwin, 1987; see also Rokkan and Urwin, eds., 1982. explained in reference to factors relating to the movements themselves nor with 
reference to differences in the center-periphery structure. We need to reach beyond 
the factors discussed above and, in particular, introduce a temporal dimension into 
the comparative framework. 
 
The approach of my study is designed to take into consideration the interests, goals, 
organization and priorities of nationalist movements as well as the response of 
central state powers from this perspective. It attempts to link different approaches 
and to focus on the often neglected interaction of the policies of ethno-territorial 
movements and central governments as they unfold over recurring feedback cycles. 
 
The guiding hypothesis is that the formation and development of ethno-territorial 
movements cannot be explained solely with reference to some form of ethnic 
substance of a certain population, culture or territory. Instead the most important 
factors are to be sought in the respective patterns of political responses to regionalist 
demands and the evolving interaction between the protest movement and the central 
state powers. A comparison of Quebec and Corsica is particularly interesting in this 
regard. The cases allow for analyzing national movements on two distinct levels: 
1. on the level of the initial response of central governments to those movements 
and the subsequent interaction of movements and states (behavioral dimensions) 
 
2. on the level of institutional or structural opportunities for nationalist strategies 
provided by the political system (structural dimension) 
 
More specifically, the comparison of the Closed-Corporatist French System and the 
Open-Federal System in Canada can help to demonstrate the impact of the different 
political environments in which nationalist movements form.  This, in turn, is helpful 
in differentiating between confining conditions (institutional, socioeconomic, cultural) 
that define the parameters for political action and other factors that are related to the 
strategies and interests of political actors.  
 
This kind of approach requires an explicit distinction between the relevant factors for 
the formation and development of the national movements. More precisely, I will 
distinguish four types of factors: 
 
1.  it is necessary to distinguish between internal and external factors. 
 2. internal and external factors can be divided further into starting conditions set 
prior to the inception of movement mobilization (ex ante factors) and process 
related aspects (ex post factors).  
 
External starting conditions determine the opportunities of newly formed movements 
to participate in the political-administrative process. In this respect it is important to 
take a closer look at institutional arrangements, political actors and established 
patterns of conflict resolution. The main focus, though, is on the process related 
factors. This includes political responses to nationalist movements by the central government and the patterns of interaction between key actors.  
 
With regard to internal factors, recent studies have generally overemphasized the 
consistency and cohesion of national movements. Even a cursory glance at the 
movements in Quebec and Corsica raises serious doubts about this assumption. 
Especially the nationalist movement in Quebec is characterized by a fundamental 
reorientation of its goals and strategies during the so called Quiet Revolution (1960 
to 1970). The formerly rural, more exclusive, and clerically oriented nationalism has 
been transformed into a more progressive and inclusive ideology. In the case of 
Corsica we must also take certain peculiarities into account. On the Mediterranean 
island the national movement confronts a historically grown clan-structure that 
creates a political environment different form the French mainland.  Further we have 
to account for the discrepant characteristics of the nationalist ideologies and rhetoric. 
Finally, on the level of internal factors we have to distinguish between starting 
conditions and process-related aspects.  
 
The former constitute the ethnic legacy that allows for a mobilisation strategy based 
on culture and language. The latter refers to conflicts and divisions within the 
developing movement.  
 
The main challenge is to demonstrate and evaluate the importance of these factors 
for the formation and evolution of nationalist movements. This in turn requires to 
distinguish three separate stages of the development of  national movement. In 
contrast to Hroch`s theory of the development of national movements
12 the approach 
employed here emphasizes the differences between the formative phase and 
subsequent phases of political interaction between state and movement. The revised 
model proposes to distinguish the following three phases that I have labeled: 
 
 
 
 
1.  Formative Phase 
2.  Breakthrough Phase 
3.  Entrenchment Phase 
 
 
 
 
Each phase is characterized by a set of conditions and corresponding variations in 
the relevance of external and internal factors. 
 
 
 
                                                       
12 See Hroch, 1985 and 1976. 
  
Tab. 1: Relevant factors for the development of nationalist movements 
 
 
 
Internal 
 
External 
 
Given 
 
- ethnic core 
- language 
- history 
- common myth 
- concepts of nationhood/nation 
 
- political institutions 
- center-periphery structure           
(system of elite accommodation) 
- political opportunity  structure 
- process of socioeconomic           
modernization 
- cultural division of labor 
 
 
process related 
 
- ideological spectrum 
- leadership 
- fragmentation 
- cohesion / internal solidarity 
- social spectrum 
- mobilisation 
 
- process of interaction 
- public policy 
- institutional reforms 
 
 
I.  Formative Phase: The formative phase starts with the first articulation of 
regionally based protest. In this phase regional interests and grievances are defined 
that may later build the base for nationalist movements. 
 
Two questions are of particular importance at this stage: What causes the protest 
and in which way is the protest articulated? First, we need a more detailed picture of 
the process of social and economic modernization of the 1950s and '60s that 
triggered a wave of political reforms as well as regional protest in western 
industrialized countries. It may be seen as the leading cause that spawned the 
regionalist conflicts. It may also be noteworthy that regional protest in Quebec as 
well as in Corsica has been expressed initially in socio-economic terms, not along 
cultural fault lines. Secondly, we have to take a closer look at the main agents of the 
protest movements, how the protest is articulated, and how the political system 
responds to the regional stress signals. Furthermore it seems interesting to compare 
the 'new' forms of protest with older forms of cultural agitation 
 
As I will discuss in more detail later, what matters most in this period are the given 
factors, on the external as well as the internal level. 
   
II. Breakthrough Phase: The beginning of the second period marks an important 
turning point in the development of the national movement. From this point on the 
variables that I have called process related factors gain a higher significance: the 
internal divisions of the movement and the interaction of the movement and the 
state. In this phase protest-articulation is becoming more cultural, and to an 
increasing extent concepts of autonomy are discussed by the movements. The 
relative influence of given and process related factors requires careful analysis to 
determine more precisely the shift from the first to the second phase. This is a major challenge as none of the factors becomes completely irrelevant at any of the three 
stages of development. Thus it may be more apt to talk of a slow and gradual 
transition from one phase to the next rather than a clear-cut turning point. But a 
central proposition of the study is that, because of the growing prominence of 
process related factors, the conflict is shaped by a different dynamic that 
progressively diminishes the influence of  the initial 'confining conditions'. 
 
The conflict dynamic under the influence of process related factors may be explained 
in the following way: the nationalist movements are trying to change the 
socioeconomic context and the patterns of institutional integration via their political 
activities.  Meanwhile the state is reacting to the new challenge through changed 
public policies.  It is this interaction and pattern of behavior that can help to further 
our understanding of the evolution of the conflict. The flexibility can be defined a 
result of the cumulative effects of political acts and policies, that bilt a contextual 
legacy in which the following actors have to act.
13 So the frame of activity is 
transformed and that leads to the above mentioned process related dynamic.  
 
III. Entrenchment Phase: The term entrenchment is not meant to imply a calming 
down of regional protest. Rather it implies that the nationalist movement has become 
a relevant actor in the regional or national arena. This may be either as a political 
party or a underground movement. The central criterion is: the movement is an actor 
that the national government has to deal with, one way or the other. Most 
movements do not reach this stage and, thus, it is seen here as a key indicator for a 
successful nationalist movement. 
 
This phase of political interaction has to be analyzed in a country specific contexts: in 
the French case this context is defined by the conflict and politics of decentralization 
and devolution that dominates the discourse of political reform since World War Two. 
The effects of the various concepts of political and economic reform have to be 
analyzed comparatively in their effect on the nationalist movement in Corsica. In this 
regard, the main question is how the politics of devolution has affected regional 
protest, and reversal, how the articulation of regional protest has shaped the central 
government's response. Similarly, in the Canadian case the conflicts over 
constitutional reform of the federal system sets the critical parameters of the political 
context of the movement in Quebec. As in the French case the reciprocal 
relationship between the Canadian federal government and the nationalist 
movement will be a major concern.  
 
Following the three stage-model as outlined I will now give an overview over the 
evolution of the ethno-territorial protest movements in Corsica and Quebec from the 
1950`s on. 
 
 
 
                                                       
13 See Rudolph and Thompson, eds., 1985.  
Corsica: radicalisation and fragmentation of the nationalist movement 
 
 
First I will discuss the Corsican nationalist movement, proposing the following 
classification of the three step-development: The first phase, which I will refer to as 
the phase of economic regionalism (formative phase), lasts from 1957 to 1970. The 
second phase, from 1970 to 1975, will be labeled autonomistic regionalism 
(breakthrough phase) and the last and third, from 1975 to present, may be termed 
nationalistic regionalism (entrenchment phase) with separationist claims.  In general, 
two questions or sets of questions will guide my analysis: First what causes the 
protest and second how can we explain its progressive radicalization? As a preview 
of the core argument the three main propositions are: First: the formation of the 
nationalist movement in Corsica is closely linked to French regional planning policies 
in the Post-World War II era. Second: The movement that formed in this period must 
be clearly distinguished from older nationalistic movements in Corsica. Third: the 
radicalization of the movement can be explained mainly be the rejection of the 
French government to cooperate with moderate forces in Corsica 
 
The first protest groups in Corsica were organized in the late 1950s as a direct 
response to the regional action program of the French government initiated in 1957. 
The program's goal was to alleviate the consequences of socioeconomic 
modernization in Corsica. The main group was named Centre d`études régionales 
Corse. It was a primarily economically oriented group and its leadership followed a 
cooperative strategy towards the French government that was designed to help the 
French government in the implementation of the regional action program.
14 This type 
of groups still constitutes one major strand of the nationalist movement. Nearly at the 
same time Corsican students on the French mainland were beginning to organize in 
student groups (Union Corse, Union national d`éstudiante corse), the core 
organizations of the second strand of Corsican nationalism. These groups were 
strongly influenced by socialist ideologies and the process of decolonisation.
15 In 
1966 the biggest two student organizations combined into the Front Régionaliste 
Corse (FRC). From the perspective of this more radical and culturally oriented strand 
of the nascent nationalist movement the situation of Corsica was interpreted as a 
part of the general decolonisation process. 
 
In the mid 1960`s the so called forces vives in Corsica - vendors and petty 
bourgoesie – were organizing the Comité d`études et de defense des interets de la 
Corse (CEDIC).
16 As in the case of the aforementioned Corsican Center for Regional 
Studies, the CEDIC represents the cooperative strand, whose primary function is to 
articulate economic interests. 1967 the FRC and the CEDIC merged into the Action 
Régionaliste Corse (ARC). But because of different interpretations of the causes of 
                                                       
14 Kofman, 1982,  p.300-312. 
15  See Peter Savigear: Corsica and the French State, in: Foster, ed., 1980, p.116-135; Dressler-
Holohan, 1987, p. 301-336. 
16 Vanina, 1983, p. 53ff. the Corsican problems the movement split only one year later again into ARC and 
FRC. Here the ARC represents the moderate wing with, again, a primarily economic 
outlook. In the 1970s, though, the moderates added a new element to their program: 
the concept of autonomy. The concept of internal autonomy had been discussed in 
the 1960`s as well,  but had not been a key element of the movements explanation 
of the political priorities of economic modernization and the displacement of the 
indigenous Corsican economy as an objective and consequence of the French 
politics of decolonialisation.
17 
 
With the adoption of 'internal autonomy' as a key political demand, the second phase 
of the evolution of the ethno-territorial movement begins: Corsican autonomism 
(period of establishing). In spite of the generally rising tensions, different degrees of 
radicalization still characterize the various parts of the movement at this stage, with 
the radical and socialistic strand represented in the FRC and a moderate and 
pragmatic strand represented by the ARC. But a second 'regional action plan' 
proposed by the French government clearly strengthened the radical wing. The new 
plan followed a narrow logic of economic efficiency and envisioned an enlargement 
of the tourism and agricultural sector on the island. Critical reports predicted a one-
sided and, in the long run, catastrophic development of the Corsican economy as the 
likely consequence of the regional plan's implementation. The French governments 
indifference towards the Corsica's main economic problems seemed to validate the 
radical view and helped to further the radicalization of nationalist rhetoric as well as 
group activities.  
 
In the mid 1970s the French government began to react to the ethno-territorial 
movement in Corsica by banning the ARC.  The event that provoked the French 
governments drastic reaction was the so called Aleria affaire. In 1975 the ARC 
seized a vineyard in Aleria to demonstrate against a wine scandal. The French state 
interpreted this public relations stunt as an immediate threat to French national unity 
and ended the occupation with massive military and police forces. The ban of the 
ARC and the  generally more repressive posture of the French government again 
lead to a further radicalization and drove parts of the movement underground.  
From this perspective the Aleria affaire can be seen as a turning point that 
demarcates the beginning of the third and final stage in the Corsican movement's 
development: the phase of separatism (entrenchment phase). To name just two of 
the more prominent organizations of the nationalist movement after 1975: The 
Fronte de la Liberation Nationale de la Corse (FLNC) is an example of the illegal 
groups, later breaking up into several new groups, among them the canal historique 
and the canal habituell. The succesor of the forbidden ARC, the Union di u Populu 
Corsu (UPC), presents an example of a legal group, working within the Corsican 
political system and regularly winning about 8 to 10% in regional elections.  
 
Whether analyzing the general trend or individual incidents, the historical sketch of 
the conflict between the nationalist movement and the French government since the 
                                                       
17 Chatelain and Tafani, 1976, p. 78ff.  late 1950s suggests a clearly defined pattern of continuous escalation. First the 
French government ignores the grievances and demands articulated by the Corsican 
movement, then reacts to the resulting radicalization in a way that deepens the rift 
between the government and the groups. Viewed from a slightly different angle, this 
spiral of escalation, based on the particular mode of interaction between the two 
sides, drives and explains the progressive radicalization in Corsica. 
 
While the  strategy and policy on the part of the French government are a vital factor, 
two other aspects need to be taken into consideration.  Both work to limit the ability 
of the Corsican movement to mobilize support: on the one hand the peculiarities of 
the Corsican political system, on the other the French socialist party’s reform 
program.  
 
With respect to the power structure of Mediterranean island the clan system is a key 
element, whose importance can hardly be overstated. For generations a few families 
have controlled the island. The French state has become dependent on this local 
elite, bringing it into the role of an intermediator or a broker between the state and 
the Corsican community. The clan system has proved to be extremely adaptive in 
the process of socioeconomic modernization and political reforms implemented as 
part of the French policies of decentralization and regionalisation. The 'devolution 
French style' has stabilized the power position of the clans and prevented the the 
new 'forces vives' from fully participating in the political process. 
 
Secondly, the socialist policy of decentralization brought Corsica a 'statute particular 
' (1982) with special rights and powers. The reform has sharply curtailed the political 
potential for nationalist mobilization on the island. The 'statute particular' offers the 
Mediterranean island special treatment well beyond the concessions associated with 
the politics decentralization. For example,  Corsica is the first French region that has 
been reorganized as a regional corporation, not merely an administrative unit, but a 
political entity with certain independent functions and powers. The electoral system 
has been reorganized to strengthen the smaller parties. The regional council of 
Corsica has been renamed 'national assembly' and, going further than institutional 
reforms in other French regions, a council for culture, education and quality of life 
has been instituted.  
 
Measured against its objectives the 'statute particular' has failed. On reason was that 
it was not implemented in a dialogue with Corsican political elites. Thus it was 
rejected by autonomists as well as separatists. The clans also rejected the proposed 
reforms, but have been able to take advantage of the reform, again strengthening 
their power position. As a consequence, the intended integration of the ethno-
territorial protest movement, or at least major parts of it, has not been achieved. As 
earlier reform programs the 'statute particular' fell short of the expectations of the 
nationalist movement. In the following decade the French socialists gave up on the 
policy of dialogue with the movement, returning to a tougher, less cooperative 
approach. 
  
 Since the mid 1980s the pattern of interaction between the French state and the 
Corsican movement has remained unchanged. The situation has been complicated 
considerably by the underground groups' cooperation with organized crime. This 
cooperation is rejected by a vast majority the Corsican population and has 
discredited the whole national movement.   
 
 
Québec: waves of nationalist mobilisation 
 
Whereas regional protest in Corsica was first articulated by newly formed groups, 
protest in Quebec found expression within the established political system from the 
outset, the main and most important agent being the Liberal Party of Québec 
(PLQ).
18 Thus 1960, the year the Liberals took power from the Union Nationale, 
seems to be the obvious date to set as the beginning of the first phase. 1960 is also 
a year discussed in the literature as the starting point of the Quiet Revolution. The 
programmatic transformation of the Liberal Party comes into sharper focus when 
viewed against the background of its traditional anti-nationalistic outlook. Until the 
1950s the PLQ had been nothing more than a regional chapter of Liberal Party of 
Canada. The PLQ had been concerned mostly with policies on the federal level and 
the party had tried to articulate francophone interests as a part of this strategy. But 
tensions rose between the growing party bureaucracies at the provincial and the 
federal level. In combination with the increasing importance of provincial institutions 
– resulting from  the  buildup of the Canadian welfare state  -  these tensions lead to 
a growing independence of the Liberal Party chapter in Quebec. The process of 
socioeconomic modernization in Canada resulted also in a fragmentation of the 
political system and the party system, primarily between the federal and provincial 
level. The centrifugal tendencies were particularly strong in the case of the 
francophone province that enjoyed a special status guaranteed by the Québec Act of 
1774. Until the 1960s the established model of elite accommodation between the 
federal state and the francophone province had worked well. But this system of 
power sharing in Quebec was not adequate to the need of the modern welfare state. 
A new middle class found its way into the Liberal Party of Québec, using it as the 
main vehicle for its integration into the political system.
19 
 
The growing significance of provincial institutions and their power in the Canadian 
federation lead to rising tensions in the PLQ. As a consequence René Lévesque left 
the party in 1968 and founded the Movement Association Souverainité and, later, the 
Parti Québécois (PQ). With the founding of the PQ the breakthrough phase begins. 
The PQ gained 23.1% of the votes in elections of 1971, won the provincial election of 
1976, and was thus able to establish itself as a relevant actor and with this electoral 
victory starts the entrenchment phase. 
 
                                                       
18 Thomson, 1986; Lemieux, 1993. 
19 See for a detailed discussion on the middle class approach: McRoberts, 1993 and Coleman, 1984.  
Since the 1970s the PQ has been a constant and strong factor in provincial and 
national politics.
20 In the early phase we can distinguish two wings of the PQ: a 
radical wing that opted for  immediate separation of the province from Canada, and a 
moderate wing that demanded a referendum on the question of separation to be held 
before deciding on the future of the province. The latter gained control over the party 
and the election of 1976 was won with other issues than separation.  Until the 1980s 
the concept of separation did not figure prominently in the program of the PQ. It is 
hard to take the first referendum in 1980 as a clear indicator for wider support for 
independence. The referendum question was phrased in a way that implied no real 
independence from the Canadian federation, but a complex arrangement of 
souverainité association: a kind of part-time separation, with many responsibilities 
left to be shared with the Canadian federation.
21 A closer look at public opinion 
surveys indicates no support for separation beyond the proposed 'soft solution'. A 
clear cut secession from the Canadian federation was rejected by most of  Quebec's 
voters.
22 Thus after the failure of the referendum in 1980 the question of separation 
was pushed off the PQ's political agenda. Only under the new leadership of Lucien 
Bouchard, in 1989, the PQ reoriented its programmatic course to separation. 
Interestingly this move was not followed by an increased support among voters. In 
the mid 1990s separation was again on the agenda of Quebec politics. In the second 
referendum on separation in 1995 a razor-thin majority of 50.5% voted against 
separation. But as in the referendum 1980 the watered-down wording of the 
referendum question makes it hard to speak of a separation referendum. In case of 
adoption, the referendum would have given the Quebec government nothing more 
but a mandate to negotiate a reform of the Canadian federation with the federal 
government. The legal process of separation was in no way discussed.  
 
Thus the presence and strength of the PQ in the provincial political system cannot be 
taken as an indicator for the support for independence in Quebec. The party has 
presented itself as a political alternative to separation. With a partly social 
democratic and partly conservative program the PQ has tried to distinguish itself 
from the PLQ. So how can we measure support for independence in Quebec other 
than using PQ vote shares? A look at voter surveys can help us in this regard. On 
the basis of survey data we can outline waves of nationalistic mobilization in 
Quebec: an increase toward the end of the 1970s, peaking at the time of the 
referendum in 1980. After the repatriation of the Canadian constitution in 1982 a 
steep decline until the early 1990s, then again an increase leading up to the second 
referendum in 1995. Since the second referendum the support for independence fell 
off again.
23 
 
 
                                                       
20 See for an overview Fitzmaurice, 1995. 
21 See Lévesque, 1968. 
22 See for the data: Maurice Pinard: Le quatre phases du mouvement indépendantistes québécois, in: 
Pinard, Bernier and Lemieux, eds., 1970, p. 29-50. 
23 See Pinard: Le quatre phases, p.49f.  
 
Conclusions: a comparative perspective 
 
A first conclusion concerns an important difference between Corsica and Quebec: 
Whereas the Corsican protest movement arose outside the spectrum of established 
groups and parties, regional protest in Quebec found immediate expression within 
the established political system. This difference reflects varying opportunities for 
participation that the French and the Canadian system offer.  France in the 1950s 
and early 1960s is characterized as a société bloquée.
24 The traditional political elites 
from the third and fourth republic dominated the administrative system. Thus there 
was little chance for the new 'forces vives' - especially in Corsica - to gain access to 
the political system. In the case of Corsica the clan system worked as an additional 
barrier preventing new actors from participating in the political process. The clans in 
Corsica adjusted very well to the process of socioeconomic modernization in France 
and were able to use new political opportunities opened by the French politics of 
regionalisation to consolidate their power position. 
 
In contrast the Canadian political system of Canada is more open to new political 
forces, particularly at the provincial level. The general trend toward realignments of 
the provincial party systems seems to be a good indicator of this political openness. 
Furthermore the traditional elites of Quebec society proved to be less successful in 
adapting to the requirements of a modern welfare state. Quebec had passed early 
through the process of industrialization and urbanization. But the traditional elites - 
represented politically in the Union Nationale - had been able to defend their power 
position until the Second World War. The Anglophone part of the Quebec society 
was the agent of industrialization in the francophone province and the francophone 
elite dominated the cultural sector and the educational system.
25  As a result of the 
economically dominant position of the Anglophones, the francophone population 
developed a culturally oriented ideology of  'survivance'. This ideology lacked 
economic as well as political substance, relying instead to a large degree on 
Catholicism as a basis for its worldview.  The traditional francophone nationalism 
was also inwardly directed and closed to newcomers. 
 
The old style nationalism increasingly came under attack in the 1950s. As a result of 
socioeconomic modernization a new dynamic political elite formed in Quebec that 
departed from the traditional francophone nationalism, taking two different directions: 
one strand rejected any form of nationalism in the name of liberalism. A prominent 
figur of this strand is Pierre Trudeau, the later premier of Canada. This strand was 
acting mainly on the federal level to improve the conditions of the francophones in 
Canada. The politics of bilingualism and multiculturalism are examples of this 
perspective. A new form of francophone nationalism was developed by the second 
strand, more politically and territorially oriented than its predecessor. This new 
                                                       
24 Crozier, 1973. 
25 See for the cultural division of labour in Quebec: McRoberts, 1993, p.61ff. nationalism can be distinguished by its understanding of the concept of a nation and 
the national subject: the francophones were replaced by the Québécois.   
 
The different opportunities for access to the political system in Canada and France 
also determine  the ability to push for the accommodation of interests and demands 
within the system. I will call this integration- and legitimation advantage. In this 
regard the position of the PQ is decidedly stronger than that of the nationalist parties 
in Corsica. As a party in government the PQ can feed much of its program into the 
political process. On the one hand this has worked to in favor of the nationalist party 
in Quebec. On the other hand, though, it decreased the perceived need of 
separation as seen by Quebec voters. The introduction of different language 
legislations in Quebec, seems a good example for this ambiguous effect. After the 
enactment of these language bills support for independence in Quebec declined 
markedly.
26 
 
The nationalists in Corsica have not been equally successful in bringing their ideas 
and demands into the political process. The French state opposed most of the 
nationalist demands. A few regionalist ideas were considered and adopted, but 
mainly through established political forces as the Socialist party of France. This often 
resulted in a decline of support for the nationalists and a radicalization of some parts 
of the nationalist movement. In this respect, too, the spiral of escalation has had the 
consequences for the cohesion and consistency outlined above. The weakness of 
the Corsican movement in bringing their goals and interests into the political process 
can be explained partly by the antagonistic posture of the French state, and partly by 
the selective adoption of regionalist concepts by the French Socialist Party in the 
1970s that lead to the policies of decentralization and regionalisation. In this way 
regional protest articulation was channeled into established institutions of conflict 
resolution. With the exception of the little Mediterranean island, regional protest in 
France subsided in most parts of the country. But the traditional pattern of party 
politics in Corsica with its strong ties between parties and family clans weakened the 
effects of decentralization and regionalisation. The established forms of 
accommodation of local elites continued to work and the programs and institutions 
created under the policy of decentralization quickly came under the control of the 
clan parties. This peculiar structure, that frustrates the national movement in 
pursuing its goals, distinguishes Corsica from the French mainland. From this 
perspective the radicalization and fragmentation of the Corsican nationalist 
movement can largely be attributed to three external and process related factors: 1. 
the traditional political forces in Corsica, 2. central state antagonism toward the 
nationalists, and 3. adoption of regionalist demands into the Socialist Party's 
program. 
 
Quebec offers a completely different picture. The historically rooted pattern of 
Canadian federalism provides considerable leeway to the provincial political 
systems. This latitude gives new forces ample opportunity to participate effectively in 
                                                       
26 See Reginald Whitaker: The Quebec Cauldron. A recent account, in: Gagnon, ed., 1984, p.70-91, 
esp. p. 81f.  the political process.  In combination with the weakness of traditional actors - the 
Union National and the Catholic church - and their inability or refusal to adapt to the 
realities of the modern welfare state, this situation created an opening for the 
nationalists. On one hand, the strong representation of francophone interests at the 
national level (factor Trudeau) facilitated the acceptance of the nationalist movement 
in Quebec. On the other hand, it weakened the support for the nationalist drive for 
separation. Thus nationalist mobilization has only been successful in periods of 
federal antagonism. This pattern explains the waves of national mobilization in 
Quebec.  Only in times of conflict as in the early 1980s and the patriation of the 
constitution or the debate about Meech Lake and the Charlettetown Agreement, the 
nationalists were able to mobilize for separation. After the reforms were implemented 
or failed, the support for the concept of separation dropped again. Another factor that 
weakens the nationalist movement is the PQ itself. With its successes as the 
governing party in Quebec - as illustrated by the example of the language bill - the 
PQ helped Canadian federalism to work effectively. Political success in Quebec is 
interpreted by the electorate - as polling results show - not as an argument for 
separation, but for the effectiveness of federalism. For the PQ this poses a serious 
dilemma: Successful governance stabilizes the Canadian federation, failure as a 
governing party strengthens the opposition in Quebec - the PLQ and its concept of 
autonomy. 
 
Thus the comparison of the two nationalist movements allows for the following 
conclusions with regard to the different sets of factors outlined above: 
 
a) Internal and given factors: Both movements were formed in times of rapid 
socioeconomic change and in reaction to state policies that tried to accommodate 
the processes of modernization. Both movements were able to build on a set of 
internal and given factors (common language, history, myths etc.). But in both cases 
the appeal to ethnicity as an instrument of mobilization was used only at a later stage 
in the interaction between the protest movement and the state. The first protest 
articulation was primarily economic. Thus in both cases internal/given factors played 
an important role: a language different from the core society, a shared history and 
myth as well as a fully developed concept of nationhood based on historical 
experience. But the fact that this fits both regions and that in both cases the appeal 
to ethnicity as an instrument for mobilization was used only at a later stage in the 
process of interaction makes it hard to see these factors as sufficient to explain the 
different paths of evolution of the movements. 
 
b) External and given factors: The established political and economic institutions in 
France and Quebec determined the opportunities for access of new forces to the 
system. The established center-periphery structure in France with its informal 
channels of information and accommodation insured an effective but, viewed from 
the perspective of democratic norms, somewhat problematic representation of 
regional interests in state institutions. The Corsican clans were able to maintain their 
position as a broker between the population of Corsica and the French state. As a 
result the center-periphery structure in France, particularly with respect to Corsica, was able to adapt to the process of modernization. This was not the case in Quebec. 
Traditional elites and established structures of accommodation proved unable to 
adapt to the realities of a modern welfare state. Because of the weakness of the 
traditional elites and the relative openness of the provincial political systems in 
Canada, the new forces in Quebec were able to participate in the political process. 
The openness also weakened the radical elements of the movement in Quebec and 
prevented a radicalization of the movement as in the Corsican case. Aside from the 
lesser degree of radicalization the nationalist movement in Quebec was able to 
establish itself as an important political actor in the province as well as on the federal 
level. The patterns of Canadian federalism facilitated this development. Thus, in this 
regard we have clearly different situation: the relatively open and accessible 
Canadian federal system, and the closed unitary French system. we can further 
differentiate between the flexible system of elite accommodation in Corsica and the 
failed elite accommodation between the province and the federal government in 
Quebec. The differences in the political opportunity structures in Quebec and 
Corsica are key factors for the differing paths of development the nationalist 
movements have taken. 
 
c) Process-related-internal factors: Clear distinctions also emerge comparing the 
nationalist movement in Quebec with the Corsican movement with respect to internal 
and process related factors. The movement in Quebec shows a strong cohesion as 
well as a strong internal solidarity and leadership, but hardly any sign of 
fragmentation. This can be explained mainly by the success of the movement on the 
provincial level and partly by the integrative strategy of the federal government. In 
contrast, the Corsican movement is highly fragmented, with weak cohesion and little 
internal solidarity, a consequence of the strategy of confrontation of the French state 
and the persisting ideological rifts within the movement. Further we can distinguish 
different strategies of mobilization. Since the early 1950s the movement in Quebec 
has focused mainly on party politics and has sought to establish itself as a regular 
political party. In Corsica we see a more diverse spectrum of mobilization strategies: 
in the early phase ad-hoc mobilization with congresses and demonstrations. Only in 
the late 1970s parts of the nationalist movements in Corsica began to organize as 
political parties, but ad-hoc mobilization and terrorism were - and are to this day – 
still pursued as instruments of nationalist mobilization. 
 
d) Process-related-external factors: This forth set of factors is partly dependent on 
the other three sets of factors, in particular the given external factors that determine 
the chances of political and institutional reform and interaction between the 
nationalist movement and the state. Thus we can clearly distinguish between the 
French and the Canadian case concerning reform projects and patterns of 
interaction. The politics of confrontation of the French state has lead to a spiral of 
escalation as the dominant pattern of interaction between the ethno territorial 
movement in Corsica and the French state. The decentralization project of the 
Socialist Party in 1982 did not fulfill the expectations of the Corsican protest 
movement. The development of the movement in Corsica can mainly be explained 
by this process of interaction and the French policies toward Corsica. In Canada on 
the other hand the more integrative pattern of Canadian federalism facilitated the integration of the Québec nationalist demands into the established patterns of 
interest accommodation. The integrative strategy  has decreased the mobilization 
potential of the nationalist movement in Quebec and only in times of constitutional 
reform nationalist mobilization seems a viable strategy. The Parti Québécois as the 
main force of the nationalist movement established itself as a acteur normale in the 
Canadian federal system and, with its success, diminished the chances for an 
independent Quebec, but remains in a position to strengthen the status of Quebec 
within the Canadian federation. 
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